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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
As a small jet flew over the moon drenched ocean, a young American
businessman awoke from a drug-induced sleep only to be confronted by
his foreign captors. I Blinking his eyes to regain his focus, the young man
started to remember the events of that evening. He recalled walking along
a quiet street in New York City, when he was startled by a strong arm
around his neck and a simultaneous pinch on his left arm. As his body
went limp, he was thrown into the back seat of a nearby dark colored
sedan. But who are these people? thought the young man, as he refocused
visually on his immediate surroundings and listened to the faint roar of jet
engines. As he sought an answer, his mind immediately recalled his
company's recent criminal difficulties in a foreign land. His suspicion that
his abduction was connected in some way to that situation was confirmed
when his captors started questioning him about those exact charges. He
thought for a while of how difficult his predicament would be in the near
future, but he found relief in the thought that the United States government
would rescue him from the nightmare.
While the events portrayed above appear to be something out of a
Tom Clancy novel, 2 the basis for such a scenario lies within a United
States Supreme Court decision-a decision that could impact the United
* 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
1. See Bills To Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S.
Government Employees and Citizens Abroad 1985: Hearing on S. 1373, S. 1429, and S.
1508 Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1985) (statements of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the
State Department). Mr. Sofaer, in his testimony before the Senate Committee, used a
similar hypothetical to support his position and asked the Committee the following
question: "[Hiow would we feel if some foreign nation-let us take the United
Kingdom-came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in New York City, or Boston,
or Philadelphia ... because we refused through normal channels of international, legal
communications, to extradite that individual." Id.
2. Thomas Clancy is an American author well-known for his intricate spy novels.
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States' position in the international community from both the moral and
legal perspectives.
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,3 the United States Supreme
Court decided the issue of whether United States courts have jurisdiction
over a criminal defendant who was forcibly abducted by surrogates of the
U.S. government and brought to the United States from a nation with
which the United States had an extradition treaty. 4 In deciding the case,
the Supreme Court examined the related issues of whether the abduction
was outside the terms of an extradition treaty between the United States
and the foreign nation, and whether general principles of international law
provided a basis for interpreting the extradition treaty to include implied
terms prohibiting international abductions.'
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that the forcible
abduction of the respondent did not violate the extradition treaty between
the United States and Mexico and, therefore, did not prohibit the
respondent's trial in this country for violations of U.S. criminal laws.6
Moreover, the Court resolved that neither the language nor the history of
negotiations and practice under the extradition treaty supported the
assertion that it prohibited abductions by the signatories.' The Court
further concluded that it could not imply in the extradition treaty a term
prohibiting international abductions.' While the Court conceded that the
abduction of the respondent was "shocking" and a possible violation of
principles of general international law, it determined that the final decision
of whether the respondent should be returned to Mexico was a matter best
left to the Executive Branch of the United States government. 9
3. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
4. Id. at 657.
5. Id. at 655.
6. Id. at 669-70. The Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th
Cir. 1991), and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 670.
7. Id. at 665. The Court noted that "[tihe Treaty says nothing about the obligations
of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the
territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if an such abduction
occurs." Id. at 663.
8. Id. at 668-69. The Court stated that "to infer from this Treaty and its terms that
it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes
beyond established precedent and practice." Id.
9. Id. at 669. The Court conceded that "[the] respondent and his amici may be correct
that respondent's abduction was 'shocking,' Tr. Oral Arg. 40, and that it may be in
violation of general international law principles." Id.
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This comment examines the case law relied upon by the majority of
the Court to support the decision that the abduction of a foreign national
from his home country does not violate the individual's right to due
process under the United States Constitution. It also analyzes the Supreme
Court's reasoning that such abductions do not violate the terms and
conditions of an existing extradition treaty. Finally, this comment
analyzes the Alvarez-Machain decision in terms of the underlying policy
issues the Supreme Court addresses, and how the decision could, as
previously stated, weaken the United States' legal and moral standing in
future international legal challenges.
]I. THE FACTS
On February 7, 1985, Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) was abducted outside
of the American Consulate in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico. 10
Approximately one month later, Camarena-Salazar's mutilated body was
discovered outside Guadalajara along with the body of Alfredo Zavala-
Avelar, a Mexican pilot who assisted Camarena-Salazar in his assignment
to locate marijuana plantations."' After an extensive D.E.A. investigation
code named "Operation Leyenda, "2 the United States government secured
the indictment of twenty-two persons charged with various crimes in
connection with the murders of Camarena-Salazar and Zavala-Avelar.
13
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national who practiced
obstetrics and gynecology in Guadalajara, Mexico, was one of the twenty-
two persons indicted in connection with the murders.14 The doctor was
10. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
11. Id. at 602.
12. Id. at 601.
13. Id. Three of the twenty-two persons indicted were brought before the district court
by means of forcible abduction from Mexico. Id. at 602.
14. Id. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was charged in a superseding indictment, returned on
January 31, 1990, with conspiracy to commit and committing violent acts in furtherance
of an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (1994);
conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(5), (c) (1994); kidnap
of a federal agent under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) (1994); and felony murder of a federal
agent under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114 (1994). Id. at 601 n.1.
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accused of administering life-sustaining drugs to Canarena-Salazar during
his interrogation and related torture by Mexican drug lords. 5
Beginning in late 1989, the D.E.A. tried unsuccessfully to secure Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's presence in the United States through informal
discussions with representatives of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MFJP).16  During this same period, the D.E.A. advised Garate, an
informant, to convey to his contacts in Mexico that the D.E.A. would pay
$50,000 for the delivery of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the United States.1
7
In subsequent conversations with the D.E.A., Garate informed agency
personnel that his contacts could successfully apprehend the doctor and
deliver him to the United States.'"
On April 2, 1990, five or six armed men, one of whom flashed a
Mexican federal police badge, burst into the office of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain.' 9 The doctor was abducted and placed on a twin engine airplane
that transported him to El Paso, Texas, where he was immediately arrested
by D.E.A. agents.20 The D.E.A. subsequently paid a partial reward of
$20,000 to the abductors and also assisted their families in relocating from
Mexico to the United States.
21
15. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657 (1992).
16. See Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602-03. The attempts were started in
December 1989, when MFJP Commandante Jorge Castillo del Rey, through D.E.A.
informant Garate, sought a meeting with the D.E.A. to discuss the possible exchange of
a Mexican national suspected of involvement in the murder of Camarena-Salazar for Isaac
Naredo Moreno. Id. at 602. Moreno was residing in the United States and was wanted
by Mexico's Attorney General in connection with the theft of large sums of money from
Mexican politicians. Id. In a subsequent meeting with the D.E.A., Castillo del Rey
agreed to deliver Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the United States in exchange for the Ulniied
States' promise to determine Moreno's immigration status and begin deportation
proceedings against him if he was determined to be deportable. Id. Shortly thereafter,
D.E.A. informant Garate advised the D.E.A. that the Mexican officials would require
$50,000 in advance to cover the expense of transporting Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the
United States. Id. The D.E.A.'s refusal to front the money for the operation resulted in
the undoing of the agreement. Id.
17. Id. at 603.
18. Id. A D.E.A. agent testified that the abduction and the final terms of the abduction
had been approved by the D.E.A. in Washington, D.C., and that he believed the United
States Attorney General's Office had also been consulted. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. It was alleged that the D.E.A. actually participated in the related activities in





Reacting to the abduction, the Mexican government presented a
diplomatic note to the United States government requesting a detailed
report on the possible participation by the United States in the abduction
of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 22 Subsequently, a second diplomatic note was
transmitted to the U.S. government by the Mexican government. It
contained the following statement:
The Government of Mexico considers that the kidnapping of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain and his transfer from Mexican territory to the
United States of America were carried out with the knowledge of
persons working for the U.S. government, in violation of the
procedure established in the extradition treaty in force between
the two countries.23
Finally, the Mexican government sent a third diplomatic note
requesting the arrest and extradition of a D.E.A. informant and the
D.E.A. agent-in-charge of the Camarena-Salazar murder investigation,
both of whom had been charged in Mexico with crimes relating to the
abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain.24 The United States government
ignored the request and moved to try the doctor on a number of charges:
conspiracy to commit and committing violent acts in furtherance of an
enterprise engaged in racketeering activity;25 conspiracy to kidnap a federal
agent;26 kidnapping of a federal agent;27 and felony murder of a federal
agent.2
IH. ON THE ROAD To THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
A JOURNEY THROUGH THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In United States v. Caro-Quintero,29 Dr. Alvarez-Machain sought to
22. Id. at 604 n.9. On May 20, 1990, the district court ordered the government to
submit to the court "'any documents indicating that the government of Mexico has filed
an official protest regarding the abduction of the defendant Machain with the United States
government' as well as translated transcriptions of any such documents." Id. The
diplomatic note was submitted by the government pursuant to the court's order. Id.
23. Id. The note demanded that Dr. Alvarez-Machain be returned to Mexico. Id.
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (1994).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(5), (c) (1994).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) (1994).
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114 (1994).
29. 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-
19961
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have the indictment against him dismissed. He argued that the District
Court for the Central District of California did not have jurisdiction over
his person and that the manner in which his physical presence was secured
constituted outrageous government conduct.3 0 The district court examined
four theories asserted by the defendant as bases for relief.3 First, the
defendant claimed that he was deprived due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 Second, he
argued that his presence in this country was obtained by means that
violated the existing extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico.33 Third, the defendant asserted that his presence in the United
States was obtained by means that violated the terms of the Charters of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States. 4 Finally, the
defendant argued that the court should dismiss the indictment as an
exercise of the court's supervisory power.35
The district court dismissed the defendant's due process claim noting
that the defendant's allegations of physical mistreatment at the hands of
United States representatives, even if true, did not rise to a due process
vialation wasranting a dismnissa, of the indictment.3 6 1However, the district
court held that the United States government violated the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico when it participated in the
abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain from Mexico. 7 Accordingly, the court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to try the defendant and ordered the
government to repatriate Dr. Alvarez-Machain to Mexico.
38
Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).






36. Id. at 605.
37. Id. at 614.
38. Id. The Court did not resolve the issues raised by Dr. Alvarez-Machain's claims
based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of
American States, and it did not address the court's supervisory power. Id. However, the
court admonished the D.E.A. by citing the following warning made fifteen years prior by
Judge Oakes in his concurrinig opinion in United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
[W]e can reach a time when in the interest of establishing and maintaining
civilized standards of procedure and evidence, we may wish to bar jurisdiction
in an abduction case as a matter not of constitutional law btit in the exercise of
[Vol. 16
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The United States government appealed the district court's decision.
While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
handed down its opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.39 As a
result of its decision in Verdugo, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision in Caro-Quintero that it lacked jurisdiction over Dr.
Alvarez-Machain. °
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed the same issues presented in Caro-Quintero: that
is, whether a defendant has a valid defense against a United States court's
jurisdiction where his presence before the court has been obtained by a
government-sanctioned kidnaping in violation of an extradition treaty and
where the violation has been officially protested by a party to the treaty.4
The court determined that the facts of the case warranted an evidentiary
hearing to determine if the defendant Verdugo had been kidnaped by the
United States government. 4  The Verdugo court further determined that
the very existence of an extradition treaty requires the signatories to abide
by the terms of the treaty when seeking jurisdiction over a criminal
defendant.43 Moreover, the Verdugo court rejected the proposition that a
country is free to invoke or ignore the terms of an extradition treaty at its
own discretion."
The court of appeals commented in Verdugo that the government's
argument in favor of forcible abductions came as an abrupt change in
policy after years of condemning the practice. 45  The court, somewhat
suspicious of the government's motives, rejected its argument that because
our supervisory power .... To my mind the Government in its laudable
interest of stopping the international drug traffic is by these repeated abductions
inviting exercise of that supervisory power in the interest of the greater good
of preserving respect for the law.
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 615 (quoting Lira, 515 F.2d at 73).
39. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 505 U.S. 1201 (1992)
(holding that the United States courts would not have jurisdiction over Verdugo if he had
been kidnapped in violation of the extradition treaty with Mexico).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1344.
42. Id. at 1359. The court remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the United
States government had authorized or sponsored the abduction. Id. at 1362.
43. Id. at 1351.
44. Id. at 1350.
45. Id. at 1354.
1996]
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the treaty did not expressly prohibit government-sanctioned abductions,
such abductions were permissible.6
IV. THE DAY OF RECKONING: A QUESTION OF ABDUCTION
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the matter of
United States v. Alvarez-Machain47 to review both the decision of the
district court that it lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Alvarez-Machain because
his abduction violated the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico, and the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirming that decision. 48  The Supreme Court held that the forcible
abduction of an individual does not violate the extradition treaty between
the United States and Mexico.49 Moreover, the Court opined that there
was nothing in the extradition treaty that directly or implicitly banned
forcible abductions by the U.S. government."0 The Court noted that
although it had not previously addressed the specific issues raised in Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's case, it had decided cases involving violations of
extradition treaties and proceedings against defendants brought before U.S.
courts by means of forcible abduction."s
In developing its decision, the Supreme Court analyzed four principal
cases that address the issues of whether an extradition treaty prohibits
abduction by the contracting nations and whether general principles of
international law provide a basis for interpreting a treaty to include implied
terms prohibiting international abductions.52
In United States v. Rauscher,53 the Court examined the issue of
whether the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which governed
extradition between Great Britain and the United States, prohibited, under
the doctrine of specialty, the prosecution of the defendant Rauscher for a
crime other than the one for which he had been extradited.54 The Court
held that a defendant whose presence before a U.S. court was the result
46. Id.
47. 502 U.S. 1024 (1992).
48. Id. at 657-58.
49. Id. at 657.
50. Id. at 663, 668-69.
51. Id. at 659.
52. Id.
53. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
54. Id. at 424.
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of an extradition could only be tried for the crime that served as the basis
for his or her extradition.55
William Rauscher, an American sailor, was indicted by the United
States government for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon
another sailor.56 In actuality, Rauscher had murdered the sailor and sought
asylum in Great Britain.57 Under the terms of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty, Great Britain extradited the defendant to the United States on the
charge of murder." Once in the United States, Rauscher was charged not
with murder but instead with the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment, an offense not specified in the treaty.59
The Rauscher Court concluded that the treaty required that both
nations abide by its terms.'o The Court stated that, even in the absence of
express language limiting the power of a signatory nation to prosecute an
extradited defendant for a crime other than the crime for which the
defendant had been extradited, the treaty required good faith compliance
with its scope and purpose."
The Alvarez-Machain Court distinguished Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
abduction from the facts of Rauscher.62 The Court stated that Rauscher
had been brought to the United States through the use of an extradition
treaty and was not forcibly abducted, while Dr. Alvarez-Machain had been
abducted without the invocation of such a treaty.63
V. THE KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
In analyzing the issue of whether the extradition treaty between the
U.S. and Mexico prohibited abductions, the Alvarez-Machain Court relied
on its holding in Ker v. Illinois,6" which the Court had decided nearly a
century ago. The Ker decision and the Court's subsequent decision in




58. Id. at 421.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 421-22.
61. Id. at 422.
62. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-61 (1992).
63. Id. at 660.
64. Id. at 655 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)).
65. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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Ker-Frisbie doctrine.66 Under this doctrine, a court's power to try an
individual for a crime is not impaired by the fact that the person had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by forcible abduction.67 Even
though Ker dealt with an international abduction and Frisbie involved a
domestic abduction, the decisions are combined because both hold that a
person who has been abducted and brought before a United States court
can be detained and subsequently tried.68
In Ker, the Supreme Court held that a court's jurisdiction over a
defendant was sustainable regardless of the method used to bring that
individual within the jurisdiction of the court.69 The case stemmed from
the criminal activities of Frederick M. Ker, an American citizen.7" Ker
fled to Lima, Peru, after being charged with larceny by authorities of
Cook County, Illinois.7 Governor John Hamilton of Illinois made a
written request to the United States Secretary of State that a warrant be
issued seeking Ker's extradition from Peru.72 The United States
government issued the warrant and, pursuant to the extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru, directed Henry Julian, a Pinkerton
agent hired by the Chicago bank from which Ker had embezzled funds, to
receive the defendant from the Peruvian authorities upon a charge of
larceny.73
66. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd
sub nom., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
67. Id. at 605.
68. See supra notes 63-64.
69. Ker, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886). In Ker, the Court stated that
[t]he question of how far [the defendant's] forcible seizure in another country,
and transfer by violence, force, or fraud, to this country, could be made
available to resist trial in the state court, for the offense now charged upon
him, is one which we do not feel called upon to decide; for in that transaction
we do not see that the Constitution, or laws, or treaties, of the United States
guarantee him any protection. There are authorities of the highest
respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason
why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the
court which has the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid
objection to his trial in such court.
Id. at 444.
70. Id. at 437.





Instead of presenting the necessary papers to the Peruvian authorities
or making any demand upon the Peruvian government to surrender Ker,
Julian forcibly abducted Ker from Peru and placed him in confinement
aboard a United States vessel bound for Honolulu.74 Ker was subsequently
transferred to another vessel that eventually arrived in California.75 Once
in California, Ker was turned over to an agent of the State of Illinois who
transported him back to Cook County, Illinois, where he was ultimately
tried and convicted for embezzlement.76
Ker made three arguments before the Supreme Court, two of which
dealt substantively with the legality of his abduction from Peru.77 First,
he argued that his arrest in and subsequent removal from Peru, and his
delivery to the authorities in Cook County, denied him due process of
law. 78 The Court dismissed Ker's argument deciding that his due process
guarantees had not been deprived by his abduction. 79 The Court stated
that Ker was not entitled to say he should not be tried at all for the crime
charged in the indictment simply because of the irregularities in the
manner in which he was brought before the trial court."0
Ker's main argument was that by virtue of the extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru, he acquired a positive right that
shielded him from being forcibly removed from Peru without the United




77. Id. at 439. Ker's third argument concerned the proceedings between the authorities
of the state of Illinois and the state of California relating to the timing of the issuance of
the warrant and the defendant's presence in the state of California. Id. at 440.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id. The Ker Court went on to state that a defendant
may be arrested for a very heinous offense by a person without any warrant,
or without any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer, and
this may be in some sense said to be 'without due process of law.' But it
would hardly be claimed that, after the case had been investigated and the
defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he could
plead that he was first arrested 'without due process of law.' So here, when
found within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois, and liable to answer for
a crime against the laws of that state, unless there was some positive provision
of the Constitution or of the laws of this country violated in bringing him into
court, it is not easy to see how he can say that he is there 'without due process
of law,' within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Id.
81. Id. at 441. Ker claimed that he acquired by his residence in Peru a right of asylum
1996]
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Ker's argument, finding no language in the treaty between the two
countries that said that an individual fleeing punishment becomes entitled
to asylum in the country to which he or she has fled. Moreover, the
Court noted that because the agent who seized Ker did not act or profess
to act under the terms of the treaty, the treaty was not operable.8 3 Ker's
abduction was viewed by the Court as a clear case of kidnapping within
Peru without any pretext of authority under the treaty or by the
government of the United States.'
In Frisbie v. Collins, 5 the Supreme Court applied its earlier ruling in
Ker and held that a court's jurisdiction over a defendant is not jeopardized
by the fact that he or she is brought before the court by means of a
forcible abduction.86 The defendant in Frisbie had been kidnapped in
Chicago, Illinois, by Michigan police officers and brought before a
Michigan court.8 7 The Court rejected the defendant's argument that he
should be released as a result of the forcible manner in which the
Michigan court gained jurisdiction over him.8 In its opinion, the Court
made the following statement:
This court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker]
that the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction. No persuasive
reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases.
They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been
fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is
nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty
person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was
brought to trial against his will.89
and a right not to be harassed for the crime he committed in Illinois. Id.
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id. at 443.
84. Id.
85. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
86. Id. at 522.
87. Id. at 522 n.5.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 522.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit created an exception to
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States v. Toscanino.9° In Toscanino, an
Italian citizen was abducted from his home in Uruguay and brought to the
United States, where he was charged with conspiracy to import narcotics
into the United States. 9 Toscanino's principal argument was that the
proceedings against him were void because his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court had been illegally obtained. 92
In its decision, the Toscanino court noted that it was faced with two
conflicting concepts of due process. 93 The first being the restrictive view
of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, and the other being the more expanded and
enlightened interpretation of due process, declared in the more recent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.94 The court decided that the Ker-
Frisbie version of due process must yield to the more enlightened version,
which required a court to dispossess itself of jurisdiction over a defendant
where such jurisdiction was acquired as "a result of the government's
deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's
constitutional rights. "95 The Toscanino court suggested that the principles
behind the exclusionary rule should be applied to persons as well as
evidence. 96 In making this suggestion, the court observed that
[w]here suppression of evidence will not suffice ... we must be
guided by the underlying principle that the government should be
denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct, and when an
accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction,
the court's acquisition of power over his person represents the
fruits of the government's exploitation of its own misconduct.'
The Second Circuit's decision in Toscanino not only extended the
exclusionary rule, but also the federal courts' power to refuse jurisdiction
90. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 268.
92. Id. at 269. The United States government never made a formal or informal request
for the extradition of Toscanino. Moreover, the Uruguayan government claimed that it
had no prior knowledge of the abduction and never consented to such an action. Id. at
270.
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in civil cases where a party's presence in a jurisdiction was secured by
force or fraud.9" The Toscanino court also viewed the government's
action as being subject to the court's supervisory power." Under its
supervisory power, the court could apply the McNabb-Mallory rule,'"
which allows courts to refuse to permit trials that are the outgrowth or
fruit of the federal government's illegality because such trials would
degTade the process of jus e.0°  The Toscanino rourt stated that
supervisory power should be used to prevent trial courts from becoming
accomplices in illegal acts.'
02
The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the defendant's allegation of outrageous conduct on the
part of the government could be substantiated.' 03 It also directed the
district court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the defendant if it found
the government's conduct to be outrageous.1' 4
While the Second Circuit provided an exception to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine in Toscanino, the same court later narrowed the exception in
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler.'"5 In Lujan, the court held that
an irregularity in the capture of a defendant does not in itself violate due
process.'0 6  The Second Circuit decided that the government conduct
complained of must rise to the level of shocking the conscience, as did the
conduct alleged by the defendant in Toscanino. 0" Unlike the defendant in
Toscanino, the defendant in Lujan never alleged torture; instead, he
alleged the illegal seizure of his person.' 8
98. Id.
99. Id. at 276.
100. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957). The so-called McNabb-Mallory rule is an exclusionary rule
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court and used "in the exercise of its supervisory
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts" to render certain
confessions inadmissible. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341.
101. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 275.
104. Id. at 281.
105. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
106. Id. at 66. The defendant in Lujan, indicted on drug charges, was enticed by
American agents from Argentina to Bolivia where he was arrested by Bolivian authorities
on behalf of the United States. Id. at 63. He was later transported to the United States.
Id.




The Second Circuit further limited the Toscanino ruling in United
States v. Lira.1"9 In that case the court held that a defendant alleging a
violation of due process must not only show torture and abduction, but
must also show that government agents were directly involved in the
misconduct. "0 The narrower interpretation of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine as
expressed in Toscanino has been recognized in several circuits."'
However, other circuit courts have rejected the Toscanino exception as
having "ambiguous constitutional origins"12 and questioned its validity in
light of the fact that the Supreme Court continued to reaffirm the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine."13
Within the framework of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the majority of the
Court in Alvarez-Machain compared the facts of Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
case to those of Ker. "14 The Court stated that the only difference between
the Ker and Alvarez-Machain cases was that Ker was decided based on the
premise that the government was not involved in the kidnapping of the
defendant. "I Dr. Alvarez-Machain found that difference to be dispositive
and argued that his prosecution, like the prosecution of the defendant in
Rauscher, violated the implied terms of a valid extradition treaty.116 The
U.S. government argued that the Rauscher exception to the Ker rule only
applied when the terms of an extradition treaty are invoked and a breach
of those terms restricts the jurisdiction of the court. 17 The Court stated
that before it could determine whether the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, it first had to
determine whether the treaty in fact prohibited abductions. 118 The Court
opined that if the treaty did not prohibit abductions, the Ker rule would
109. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
110. Id. at 71.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Palaez, 930 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing a defendant's allegations of mistreatment from the facts alleged in
Toscanino); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(recognizing Toscanino as a limited exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine but deciding it
did not apply to the facts of Yunis).
112. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteras v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 878 (1990).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied sub nom. Yamanis v. U.S., 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
114. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-61 (1992).
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apply, and it would not have to inquire into how the defendant came
before the Court." 9
The Court construed the treaty by looking to its terms and noted that
it said nothing about either. country refraining from or the consequences
for forcibly abducting citizens from the territory of the other country. 2"
Moreover, the Court noted that the history of both the negotiations of and
practice under the treaty also did not indicate that abductions outside the
treaty constituted a violation of the treaty.'
2'
After determining that the language of the treaty did not support the
argument that the treaty prohibited abductions, the Court then went on to
examine whether the treaty should be interpreted to include an implied
term prohibiting the prosecution of a defendant whose presence before a
U.S. court is obtained by means not established under the treaty. 22 Dr.
Alvarez-Machain argued that there was no need to incorporate a
prohibition against abductions into the treaty since international law clearly
prohibits such acts; 23 however, the general principles of international law
cited by the defendant failed to convince the Court that a term prohibiting
international abduction should be implied in the treaty. 24 The Court stated
that a decision based on an inference that the treaty and its terms
prohibited all means of obtaining jurisdiction over an individual outside the
terms of the treaty would exceed the bounds of established precedent and
practice.'" While the Court viewed the abduction as shocking, and
possibly a violation of general international law principles, it concluded
that the abduction was not a violation of the extradition treaty between the
United States and Mexico and, applying the Ker rule, held that the Court
had jurisdiction over the defendant. 
2 6
VI. A DISSENT FROM A "MONSTROUS" DECISION
The dissenting Justices viewed the Alvarez-Machain case as unique
and factually distinguishable from Ker and Frisbie because they involved
119. Id.
120. Id. at 663.
121. Id. at 665.
122. Id. at 666-69.
123. Id. at 666.
124. Id. at 668-69.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 669-70.
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neither an abduction by a private citizen or bounty hunter 127 nor the arrest
of a fugitive in another state.'2  The dissenting Justices believed that,
given the involvement of the U.S. government, the abduction of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain could be seen as a violation of the territorial integrity of
a country outside of the scope of the extradition treaty the country had
signed with the United States. 29 The dissent opined that a fair reading of
the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, in light of the Court's ruling in United
States v. Rauscher and coupled with applicable principles of international
law, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the district court had correctly
interpreted the treaty as prohibiting jurisdiction over a defendant who had
been forcibly abducted and brought to the United States.13
0
The dissent observed that the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico was a comprehensive document designed to assist both
countries in their joint efforts against crime. 131 To the dissenting Justices,
the treaty appeared to have been fashioned to cover every aspect of
extradition, including the delineation of procedural and evidentiary
requirements for extradition. 3 2 In analyzing the terms of the treaty, the
dissent noted that Article 9 of the treaty expressly states that neither
contracting party is required to deliver up its own nationals to the other
party, although it may chose to do so in its discretion. 133 In the event the
nation decides not to deliver the national to the requesting nation, it is
required under the treaty to "submit the case to its competent authorities
for purposes of prosecution.
", 31
The dissent rejected the government's argument that the treaty did not
constitute the exclusive means by which the United States could obtain
jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain. '3' The dissenting Justices observed
that reading the treaty in such a manner would transform its provisions
127. Id. at 670.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 671.
131. Id. at 671-73. The dissent observed that the preamble to the treaty stated that
both governments desire "to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this
end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition." Id. at 672-73.
132. Id. at 671-73.
133. Id. at 673.
134. Id. The dissent observed that Mexico had already tried a number of the
conspirators involved in the murder of the D.E.A. agent. Id. at 671. For instance, it was
noted that Rafael Caro-Quintero, a co-conspirator of Dr. Alvarez-Machain, had already
been sentenced and imprisoned to a term of forty years. Id. at 671 n.2.
135. Id. at 673.
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into little more than verbiage because the purposes of its provisions would
be frustrated if a requesting nation could simply kidnap an individual. 1
36
Finally, the dissent concluded that the provisions of the treaty only make
sense when understood as requiring each signatory to comply with the
procedures for securing jurisdiction over an individual detailed in the
treaty. 1
37
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, recognized and acknowledged
that the treaty did not contain an express commitment on the part of either
nation to refrain from forcibly abducting individuals in the territory of the
other nation. 13  However, he criticized the majority for concluding that
the parties silently reserved the right to exercise forcible abduction instead
of following the legal procedures outlined in the treaty.' 39 Justice Stevens
found that the intent of the treaty plainly implied a mutual respect for the
territorial integrity of the other nation. 40
The dissenting opinion stressed that the extradition treaty construed
in Rauscher was far less comprehensive than the extradition treaty between
the United States and Mexico. "' The dissent pointed out that,
notwithstanding this fact, the Court in Rauscher found that the treaty
constituted the exclusive means by which the United States could secure
jurisdiction over the defendant within the territory of Great Britain. 42
This finding was based on the Rauscher Court's reasoning that it did not
make sense to view a treaty that included specific requirements as
allowing, at the same time, a requesting nation to circumvent the positive
136. Id. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), the
court of appeals stated that the provisions of the treaty "would be utterly frustrated if a
kidnapping were held to be a permissible course of governmental conduct." Id. at 1349.
137. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 673-74.
138. Id. at 674.
139. Id. at 674-75. The dissent observed that, based on the majority's reasoning, the
United States could torture or execute people rather than attempt to extradite them since
those options were not expressly prohibited by the treaty. Id. Moreover, the dissent
remarked in a pointed fashion that "the Court had in effect written into Article 9 of the
treaty a new provision which states: 'Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article,
either Contracting Party can, without the consent of the other, abduct nationals from the
territory of one Party to be tried in the territory of the other."' Id. at 675 n. 11.
140. Id. at 675. The dissent noted that such an opinion is confirmed by the legal
context in which the treaty was negotiated and the fact that the United States government
never offered any evidence which supports the theory that a different understanding was
reached with Mexico. Id. at 675 n. 15.
141. Id. at 675-76.
142. Id. at 676-77.
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requirements and just implications of the treaty. 43 To the dissenting
Justices, the end result of such an interpretation of an extradition treaty
was obviously contrary to both the intent of the parties and the purpose of
the treaty. 1I"
After examining the treaty itself, Justice Stevens then cited the
uniform opinion that exists in the international community that the
violation of a nation's territorial integrity by another nation should be
condemned.' 45 Justice Stevens quoted various commentators who view
forcible abduction as nothing short of a gross violation of international
law.14 He compared the dissenters' objection to the forcible abduction of
a foreign national to the shock expressed by Justice Story in The Apollon
47
at the United States' attempt to justify the seizure of a foreign vessel in a
foreign port.
[E]ven supposing, for a moment, that our laws had required an
entry of the Apollon, in her transit, does it follow, that the power
to arrest her was meant to be given, after she had passed into
exclusive territory of a foreign nation? We think not. It would
be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were
authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the
purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws.
It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify
such a clear violation of the laws of nations. 148
143. Id. at 677.
144. Id. The dissent commented that an interpretation of the treaty in such a fashion
could lead to a request for the extradition based on one of the stated offenses covered by
the treaty, and then an attempt to try the person for political crimes which were not
covered by the treaty. Id.
145. Id. at 678.
146. Id. at 680-81. The dissent quoted the following passage from a leading work on
international law:
It is . .. a breach of International Law for a State to send its agents to the
territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of having committed
a crime. Apart from other satisfaction, the first duty of the offending State is
to hand over the person in question to the State in whose territory he was
apprehended.
Id. at 680 (quoting 1 OPPEumtS's INTERNATiONAL LAw 295 n. 1 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955)).
147. 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
148. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Justice Story's opinion in The
Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1824) (emphasis added)).
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According to the dissent, the most serious flaw in the majority's
opinion is its failure to differentiate between the actions of private citizens,
which do not violate the terms of the treaty, and the conduct of the federal
government, which constitutes a violation of international law.149 The
dissent supported this criticism with the opinion written by Justice
Brandeis in Cook v. United States. 50 The Cook case involved the
boarding of a British vessel by American prohibition agents eleven and
one-half miles from the coast line of the United States. The agents had
boarded the vessel to determine if it was illegally importing alcoholic
beverages. 5 ' At the time of the boarding, a treaty existed between the
United States and Great Britain which provided that the boarding rights of
a contracting nation could not be exercised at a greater distance from the
coast line than the vessel could travel in one hour.'52 The vessel that was
boarded and seized could only travel ten miles per hour. Strictly
construing the terms of the treaty, the Court held that the seizure violated
the treaty because it occurred at a greater distance from the shore line
(eleven and one half miles) than the distance travelled by the vessel in one
hour (ten miles).' In his opinion, Justice Brandeis also rejected the U.S.
government's argument that the illegality of the seizure was not material
because, as in Ker, the jurisdiction of the court depended upon the
defendant's presence before the court rather than whether the seizure
violated the terms of the treaty. 154 Justice Brandeis conceded that such an
argument would succeed only if the seizure were made by a private party,
as opposed to the government. 155 The dissenting Justices in Alvarez-
Machain also noted that the majority of the Court had used reasoning
similar to that in Ker to explain why its holding in Rauscher did not
apply. '56 In the Ker opinion, Justice Miller commented that the arresting
officer was not acting on behalf of the government or under the extradition
treaty when he kidnapped the defendant Ker. t5" The dissent stated that the
majority's disregard for the clear distinction between acts of private
149. Id. at 682.
150. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
151. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 682.
152. Id. at 683 n.28.
153. Id. at 682-83.
154. Id. at 683.
155. Id.




citizens and those of the government led the majority to misinterpret prior
case law.'
Finally, the dissent voiced its concern that the Executive Branch's
interest in punishing Dr. Alvarez-Machain in a United States court was not
a satisfactory reason for disregarding the rule of law. 159 The dissent noted
that it is at the point of revenge that the Court should remember that its
duty is to render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to the
law.'" Unlike the majority, the dissent expressed concern at how the
international community would view the Court's decision in Alvarez-
Machain. Since every nation that has an interest in maintaining the rule
of law will be affected by the Court's decision in the case, 6 ' the dissent
concluded that "most courts throughout the civilized world will be deeply
disturbed by [this] monstrous decision."162
VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant who is forcibly abducted from his homeland is subject to the
jurisdiction of United States courts as long as the abduction is not
expressly prohibited by any existing extradition treaty between the two
nations.I63 If an extradition treaty does not specifically prohibit abductions
in its text, the Ker rule applies and a trial court is not required to
determine how the defendant came within its jurisdiction. 1" The failure
of the Supreme Court to consider the distinction between the actions of
private citizens and those sanctioned by the U.S. government makes the
decision in Alvarez-Machain a clear assault on the sovereignty of
nations.' 65  The decision permits the Executive Branch to commit
158. See id. at 685-86.
159. Id. at 686.
160. Id. at 687.
161. Id. at 687-88.
162. Id. at 687.
163. Id. at 655.
164. Id. at 662.
165. See id. at 680-81. In support of his conclusion that an abduction outside of the
terms of an extradition treaty is a violation of international law, Justice Stevens cited the
following comments of the chief reporter of the American Law Institute of Foreign
Relations:
When done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person
from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross
disrespect for a norm high in the opinion of mankind. It is a blatant violation
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kidnappings and related criminal acts to facilitate an abduction in a foreign
nation when the applicable extradition treaty fails to expressly prohibit
such abductions.'I Moreover, by its decision in Alvarez-Machain, the
Court allows the Executive Branch to usurp and to interfere with the legal
system of the foreign nation where the original criminal act occurred,
especially if the government is not satisfied with the progress or outcome
of a case involving extraterritorial urisdictiotn. 67
While the nation was justifiably appalled by the brutal murder of an
American agent, the desire to seek revenge must be tempered by the desire
to adhere to the rule of law. 68  Quoting from Thomas Paine, Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent that "avidity to punish is always dangerous to
liberty" because it leads a nation "to stretch, to misinterpret, and to
misapply even the best of laws." 1 69  The United States' good faith
commitment to the concept and validity of extradition treaties, as well as
the general principles of international law, will be seriously undermined
as a result of this decision. 
70
Michael Slanery
of the territorial integrity of another state; it eviscerates the extradition system.
Id. at 681 (quoting Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 JOHN
MARSHALL L.J. 215, 231 (1992) (citation omitted)).
166. See id. at 673-74.
167. See id. at 673-75.
168. See id. at 687.
169. Id. at 688 (quoting TiLE COMPLETE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS PAiNE 588 (P. Foner ed.
1945)).
170. See id. at 687-88.
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